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Rosalind De Sailly 
Fact and Feeling: Baconian Science and the Nineteenth-Century Literary 
Imagination by Jonathan Smith (University of Wisconsin Press, 1994) 
One of the latest developments in the history of ideas is the history and philosophy of sci-
ence, and its increasing relevance to readers of Victorian literature is evinced by this work 
There is now a school of thought within George Eliot scholarship devoted to the scientif-
ic elements in her work, established by U. C. Knoepflmacher and consolidated by Gillian 
Beer and Sally Shuttleworth. The use of the philosophy of science as a tool to examine lit-
erary texts entails the meeting of two not antithetical disciplines, and offers a new view-
point on Eliot that is peculiarly appropriate to a writer who was so well versed in the sci-
entific revolutions of her era. 
Smith examines science as part of cultural discourse rather than as in an antagonistic rela-
tion with literature. It is evident that the Leweses were not party to such a dualism, Eliot 
and Lewes being equally concerned with finding a legitimate basis for knowledge, which 
involved them in the Victorian debate over scientific method. Smith sees this debate in 
terms of a revision of Bacon's careful inductive method to fit the needs of an era of 
expanding knowledge. Now we can recognize that the characterization of nineteenth-cen-
tury 'scientific method' as one of objectivity is incomplete. 
Lewes and Eliot sought to legitimize the workings of the imagination in the formation of 
knowledge. Lewes wrote about hypothesis and the scientific imagination: 'the experi-
ments by which the problem may be solved have to be imagined; and to imagine a good 
experiment is as difficult as to invent a good fable'. This might be compared with Eliot's 
description of the scientific imagination in Middlemarch Chapter 16 as 'the inward light 
which is the last refinement of Energy' . As literature sought to reach the authority of sci-
ence, scientists moved closer to claiming the use of the speculative imagination. 
According to Smith, the Victorians regarded science as characterized by its distance from 
sense impressions. However, the increasing awareness of the subjectivity, and conse-
quently the partiality of the observer transformed forever the paradigms of scientific 
methodology. Whewell' s criticism of Baconian empiricism that observations are neces-
sarily inaccurate is illustrated in Eliot's concrete metaphor of the pier-glass. 
In his chapter on Eliot's Mill on the Floss Smith takes Lewes's explicit statements on sci-
ence for evidence of Eliot's position, especially her opinion of Lyell in the 1850s. While 
their philosophical positions tended to cover much common ground, Smith acknowledges 
their differences when evidence is available. Lewes's Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences 
(1853) asserts the evidence for progressionism in biology in contrast to Eliot's comment 
that 'Natural Selection is not always good'. And in The Mill on the Floss Bob Jakin puts 
reason and his broad thumb - 'that difference between the man and the monkey' - to use 
for immoral ends, which suggests that man may have evolved from the monkey. 
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Smith focuses on the flood at the novel's conclusion as a trope for the realistic narrative 
as well as a natural phenomenon subject to scientific interpretation. For the Mill's confi-
dent narrator, the flood can take part in complex meanings, operating as a metaphor that 
yields higher meaning within a realist narrative. Smith disagrees with Sally Shuttleworth 
who regards the flood as undercutting an otherwise uniformitarian narrative. He sees Eliot 
as negotiating between Lyell and Darwin to affirm uniformitarianism. At the time Eliot 
was writing Lyell's strict uniformitarianism stood in opposition to all versions of the 
hypothesis of development, including Darwin's. Maggie's struggle to find her way 
between local demands and global desires parallels Eliot's difficulty in giving tragic force 
and meaning to the 'unwept, hidden' tragedy. Eliot's uniformitarian narrative casts the 
flood as uniformitarian - an example of actualism - because it is recurrent and therefore 
normal. However, as a resolution it seems to devalue the very lives the narrator has been 
at pains to unearth and expose to sympathetic view. Hence the uniformitarian's desire to 
have it both ways: to claim an event like the flood as the source of unexpected death and 
terror, while also making it represent a conservative principle essential to stability. Smith 
concludes that reader dissatisfaction is with these tensions within the uniformitarian model 
rather than with authorial intrusion. 
The novel's conclusion surveys the ravaged 'face of the earth' but the emphasis is on 'the 
eyes that have dwelt on the past' that see evidence of the human tragedy. Perhaps this 
multi-layered 'reading' of the landscape encapsulates the ideal position of the observer 
mid-century, uniting fact and feeling. Art's expression of fact as feeling is based on sci-
ence's knowing and the two modes of knowledge can be seen as interrelated. What may 
have appealed to Eliot's sense of irony is Bacon's Casaubon-like failure to complete his 
system; ultimately any scientific method, as with any knowledge, is provisional. 
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